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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Prospective amici curiae are scholars and practitioners of United States
Constitutional law.1 Together, Amici have substantial experience researching,
publishing, teaching, and litigating in the field of Constitutional law, particularly
on the constitutional right of access to the courts. Amici have a strong interest in
ensuring that immunity does not infringe on individual constitutional rights,
specifically the fundamental right of access to the courts. They submit their brief in
support of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ position that immunity should not be accorded to
the Defendants-Appellees in this case, where doing so would unconstitutionally
impinge on Plaintiffs-Appellants’ fundamental right of access to the courts.
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The list of Amici is set forth in the Appendix to this Brief. The Appellants
have consented to the participation of Amici in this case. Because the Appellees
have not appeared in this case, their consent could not be requested pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 29 and Local Rule 29.1. Amici Curiae represent that no party or
party’s counsel authored this Brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s counsel
contributed money that funded the preparation or submission of this Brief. No
person other than Amici and their counsel contributed money that funded the
preparation and submission of this Brief.
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ARGUMENT
The right to access to the courts is an ancient and fundamental right in our
constitutional tradition. It traces its roots to Magna Carta. Magna Carta, Chapters
39 and 40; see also William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts
Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee
Constitution, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 333, 349-75 (1997) (tracing the history of
Chapters 39 and 40). It is also reflected in early state constitutions. See, e.g., Md.
Const. art. XIX (“That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or
property, ought to have remedy by course of the Law of the land, and ought to
have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily
without delay, according to the Law of the land.”). Although it is not specifically
mentioned in the Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized the right
since 1803. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”). Today, the Supreme
Court locates the right in various provisions of the Constitution, including due
process and equal protection. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996).
In perhaps its most succinct form, the right means that the government may
not “bolt the door to equal justice.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). The
government might do that by imposing access fees at trial or on appeal, see, e.g.,
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Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); stripping the courts of
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (noting the
“‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal statute were
construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim”); or even
by blocking physical access to the courtrooms. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
531 (2004). But however the government “bolts the door to equal justice,” the
Supreme Court evaluates a barrier to the fundamental right to access to the courts
by balancing two competing interests. On the one hand, the Court “inspects the
character and intensity of the individual interests at stake . . . .” M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996). On the other, the Court evaluates “the
[government’s] justification for its exaction . . . .” Id.
In this case, the district court “bolt[ed] the door to equal justice” by granting
absolute immunity to the United Nations, the United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti, and two of their officers (together, the “UN”). The court’s grant of
absolute immunity means that the plaintiffs in this case have no way to access the
courts, and no means to protect their significant interests. Thus, the “character and
intensity” of the plaintiffs’ interests are significant, and the court’s application of
absolute immunity infringes on the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to access to the
courts. At the same time, the government has failed to offer any justification for
absolute immunity for the UN as applied in this case. Therefore, on balance, the
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court’s grant of absolute immunity to the UN in this case violates the plaintiffs’
fundamental right to access the courts.

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO
THE UN INFRINGES ON THE PLAINTIFFS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO ACCESS TO THE COURTS.
At the first step, in “inspect[ing] the character and intensity of the individual

interests at stake,” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996), the Court
evaluates three access-to-the-courts factors to determine whether a barrier infringes
on the fundamental right to access to the courts. First, the Court evaluates the
degree of interference of the government’s barrier to full access to the courts. The
greater the barrier’s interference with full access, the more likely the barrier
infringes on the fundamental right to access. Next, the Court examines the strength
of the underlying interests of those subject to the government barrier and thus
denied access. The stronger the interests, the more likely the government barrier
infringes on the fundamental right to access. Finally, the Court evaluates the
alternative or non-judicial avenues that are available for relief. If the plaintiffs lack
alternatives, then the government barrier more likely infringes on the fundamental
right to access. Based on these factors, the Court assess the “character and
intensity” of the interests and determines, at the first step, whether the barrier
infringes on the fundamental right to access to the courts.
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In this case, all three factors show that the “character and intensity” of the
plaintiffs’ interests are significant, and that the district court’s grant of absolute
immunity to the UN infringes on the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to access to the
courts. First, the court’s application of absolute immunity creates a total barrier to
access for the plaintiffs, in that it completely bars them from the courts. Next, the
plaintiffs’ interests in life, family, health, and basic subsistence, among others, are
significant, and comparable to the high-level interests that the Court has protected
in its jurisprudence on the fundamental right to access. Finally, the plaintiffs have
no alternative to the courts, because the UN has refused to engage outside of the
courts and to honor its obligations to provide relief. As a result of the UN’s refusal,
the plaintiffs have nowhere else to turn to protect their significant interests in the
on-going cholera epidemic.
Because the three access-to-the-courts factors so strongly favor the
plaintiffs, together they show that the court’s grant of absolute immunity to the UN
infringes on the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to access the courts.

A.

The Court’s Grant of Absolute Immunity Creates an Insurmountable
Barrier to Access to the Courts.

The first factor that the Court considers in evaluating the individual interests
is the degree of interference by the government’s barrier to full access to the
courts. On the one hand, a government barrier can operate as a “partial” barrier to
	
  

5

access, as when the government denies a litigant a court-appointed attorney in a
case involving a significant interest or fundamental right. When this happens, the
Court assesses the “partial” barrier on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (holding that the
courts should assess a mother’s request for court-appointed counsel in a
termination-of-parental-rights proceeding on a case-by-case basis). But on the
other hand, when a government barrier denies a litigant all access to the courts, as
here, the barrier weighs heavily in favor of finding a violation of the fundamental
right to access to the courts.
Thus, for example, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court wrote that a physical
barrier to the courts for some litigants infringed on those litigants’ fundamental
right to access to the courts. In particular, the Court held that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which bans discrimination on the basis of
disability in all state services and programs, including state courts, was “congruent
and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts” (and
therefore valid legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). The Court said that the congressional
record sufficiently reflected physical barriers to access to the courts for individuals
with disabilities: “Congress learned that many individuals, in many States across
the country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by
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reason of their disability. . . . Congress itself heard testimony from persons with
disabilities who described the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses.” Lane,
541 U.S. at 527. In other words, physically inaccessible courthouses worked a flat
prohibition on all access to the courts by the physically disabled, and Congress was
justified in banning inaccessible courthouses in order to enforce the fundamental
right to access to the courts. See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)
(noting that a jurisdiction stripping statute that denied all judicial relief for a
colorable constitutional claim would raise a “serious constitutional question”).
The district court’s grant of absolute immunity to the UN is the same kind of
barrier to all access to the courts as the physical barriers were in Lane. Just as the
physical barriers in Lane barred all access to the courts for all purposes, the court’s
application of absolute immunity bars all access to the courts for the named
plaintiffs and their families who were killed, injured, or otherwise harmed by the
cholera epidemic and who continue to suffer from the epidemic. The court’s grant
of immunity based on Section 2 of the CPIUN is a sweeping claim that leaves no
room for access to the courts (or any other forum, for any other kind of relief). This
absolute bar to any form of judicial review is the same kind of absolute barrier to
access that Congress addressed in Title II of the ADA and that the Court addressed
in Lane.
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This absolute bar weighs heavily in favor of finding that the district court’s
grant of absolute immunity violates the right to access.

B.

The Plaintiffs’ Interests Are Significant.

The next factor that the Court considers in assessing the individual interests
is the weight of the individual litigants’ underlying interests in the case. When
these individuals’ underlying interests are significant, as here, the government
barrier to access more likely interferes with the fundamental right to access to the
courts.
For example, the Supreme Court in Mayer v. Chicago struck a transcript fee
for an appeal of a conviction of a petty offense resulting in a $500 fine, but no jail
time, for the defendant. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971). The
transcript fee was a barrier to access to the courts for the defendant, an
“impecunious medical student,” because he could not afford to pay it and therefore
could not appeal his conviction. Id. The Court said that while the penalty involved
no term of confinement for the defendant, it could affect his professional prospects
and even bar him from the practice of medicine. Id. at 190.
Similarly, the Court in Lindsey v. Normet struck a double-bond requirement
for tenants seeking to appeal their evictions. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79
(1972). Just like the transcript fee in Mayer, the double-bond requirement was a
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barrier to access to the courts, because it prevented a tenant who could not afford it
from appealing an eviction and protecting his or her underlying interest in housing.
Id. at 79. The Court held that while the Constitution did not require appellate
review, if the state nevertheless provided appellate review the double-bond
requirement violated equal protection, because it applied only to tenants facing
eviction, and to no other litigants. Id.
Finally, the Court in Little v. Streater required the state to pay for blood tests
sought by an indigent litigant to allow him to contest a paternity suit. Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981). Without the blood tests, the putative father was
unable under state law to lodge an effective defense. The Court wrote that the
putative father’s interests in the case were “substantial,” even if not fundamental:
“Apart from the father’s pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support
obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for
noncompliance, at issue is the creation of parent-child relationship.” Id. at 13.
In each of these cases involving important (though not fundamental)
interests, the Court struck fee barriers that operated as absolute bars to equal
access. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 3713, 382 (1971) (striking a filing
fee for divorce, where the underlying interest (the right to dissolution of a
marriage) was significant or fundamental, the fee created an absolute barrier to
access, and the litigant could not safeguard the right in an alternative forum);
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M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1996) (striking a record preparation fee for
an appeal of a termination of parental rights, where the underlying interest
(parental rights) was fundamental, the fee created an absolute barrier to access, and
the litigant could not protect her parental rights in any other forum).
The plaintiffs’ interests in this case easily equal or exceed the interests in a
professional career, Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197; housing, Lindsey, 405 at 74-79
(1972); and avoiding erroneously created parent-child relationship and erroneously
imposed child support. Little, 452 U.S. at 13. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ interests in this
case are no less than life itself. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to stop the
cholera epidemic from getting worse and to remediate the waterways in order to
prevent more deaths and illnesses. They also seek support toward health, basic
subsistence, and the ability to send their children to school. (Pls’ App. A-60, A-64,
A-65.) Thus, the plaintiffs have significant interests in life, health, and basic
subsistence, among others, in this case.
These are no mere economic interests of the kind in United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973), or Ortwein v. Schwab. 410 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1973).
In Kras the Court upheld a $50 fee to secure a discharge in bankruptcy. The Court
said that bankruptcy discharge involved no “fundamental interest,” and debt
forgiveness did not require access to the courts. Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45 (1973).
Similarly, in Ortwein the Court upheld a $25 filing fee for litigants who sought
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judicial review of an agency reduction in their welfare benefits. Ortwein, 410 U.S.
at 660-61. But the plaintiffs’ interests in this case far exceed the mere economic
interest in discharging debt or filing for welfare benefits. Again, the individual
plaintiffs’ interests in this case include life, family, health, and basic subsistence,
among other significant interests involved in stopping and mitigating the effects of
the cholera epidemic.
The individual plaintiffs’ interests in this case are significant. And taken
together with the other two access-to-the-courts factors—the absolute barrier to
access created by the district court’s application of absolute immunity and the lack
of alternative, non-judicial forms of relief—the significance of the plaintiffs’
interests means that the court’s application of absolute immunity infringes on their
fundamental right to access the courts.

C.

The Plaintiffs Have No Other Alternative Avenue for Relief.

Finally, the third factor that the Court considers in evaluating the individual
interests at stake is the availability of alternative and non-judicial forms of relief.
When the plaintiffs lack alternatives to vindicate and protect their underlying
interests, as here, this means that the government’s barrier more likely infringes on
their fundamental right to access to the courts.
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Thus in cases where individuals lacked alternative ways, outside the
judiciary, to protect their significant interests, the Court ruled that the
government’s barrier violated those individuals’ fundamental right to access to the
courts. For example, in Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court struck the filing fee for
divorce in part because the litigant had no other way, outside the courts, to obtain a
divorce. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971); see also Mayer v.
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) (striking an appellate fee in a case where the
litigant had no other way, outside the courts, to appeal his conviction); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79 (1972) (striking the double-bond requirement to appeal
an eviction in a case where the litigant had no other way to appeal an eviction);
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (striking a blood test fee in a case where
a father had no other way, outside the courts, to contest paternity); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973) (upholding a filing fee for bankruptcy, because
the litigant had other ways, outside the judiciary, to discharge debt).
Just like the litigants in these cases, the plaintiffs here also lack alternative
ways to protect their significant interests outside of the judiciary. The UN’s and
MINUSTAH’s failures to own up to their obligations under Section 29 of the
CPIUN, the SOFA, and the UN Charter leave the plaintiffs with no alternative
remedies outside of this Court. (See generally Appellants’ Brief at 15-47.) Stated
differently, this Court has “monopoly” power over the plaintiffs’ interests, just as
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the courts in Boddie had “monopoly” power over divorce. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375.
Because the plaintiffs lack any alternative or non-judicial way to protect their
significant interests, the government’s blanket assertion of immunity on behalf of
the UN infringes on the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to access to the courts.
In sum, because each of the three access-to-the-courts factors so strongly
favor the plaintiffs, together they show that the “character and intensity” of their
interests are significant, and that the district court’s grant of absolute immunity to
the UN infringes on the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to access to the courts.

II.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE A STRONG
INTEREST.
At the second step in the access-to-the-courts analysis, the Court examines

“the [government’s] justification for its exaction . . . .” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 120-21 (1996). In this case, the government has not asserted a justification for
the district court’s application of absolute immunity for the UN. In other words, it
has not given a reason for erecting this absolute barrier that works to “bolt the door
to equal justice.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956).
Indeed, as explained fully in the Appellants’ brief, the district court’s
application of absolute immunity in favor of the UN conflicts with the more careful
design for immunity established by the UN’s Founders. (Appellants’ Brief at 1519.) The sweeping application of absolute immunity also conflicts with legal
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obligations of the UN and MINUSTAH to settle private-law claims and establish a
commission for harms arising out of their operations in Haiti. (Appellants’ Brief at
20-38.) And the application of absolute immunity is based upon an unduly
cramped reading of the CPIUN. (Appellants’ Brief at 44-47.)
The absolute immunity that the district court applied in this case is different
from other kinds of immunities, like “judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity,
and legislative immunity,” in which the government may have a strong interest.
Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that if the court
accepted the plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments challenging the CPIUN on its
face, these other forms of immunity “could not exist”). These other kinds of
immunities identified in Brzak—judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative—are easily
distinguishable from the absolute immunity that the district court applied here. For
one, these immunities are based on the Constitution, or they were well-settled in
the common law upon ratification of the Constitution and thus formed part of the
background understanding of the Constitution. See generally District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (explaining how laws, practices, and understandings
that pre-dated the Constitution inform the meaning of the Constitution). In short, as
part of the Constitution itself or the fabric of the Constitution, these immunities
themselves cannot violate the Constitution or the fundamental constitutional right
to access to the courts.
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For example, judicial immunity is deeply rooted in the common law. Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) (“The immunity of a judge for acts
within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common
law.”) Prosecutorial immunity has similarly deep roots. Id. at 422-23 (“The
common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that
underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the
scope of their duties.”) Legislative immunity has deep common law roots and is
based on the Constitution itself. Tenney v. Bradhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951)
(“Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a matter of course
by those who served the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation. It was
deemed so essential for representatives of the people that it was written into the
Articles of Confederation and later into the Constitution.”) Other official
immunities have similarly deep common law roots, pre-existing the Constitution.
See, e.g., United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 505 (D.N.J. 1978) (tracing the
history of modern diplomatic immunity and stating, “[t]hus, it can be said that the
fundamental principles of modern diplomatic immunity were in active use 2,000
years ago. Their use as been continuous since that time.”); Victory Transport Inc.
v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d
Cir. 1964) (stating that “[t]he doctrine [of sovereign immunity] originated in an era
of personal sovereignty, when kings could theoretically do no wrong and when the
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exercise of authority by one sovereign over another indicated hostility or
superiority,” and that the doctrine “was earlier entrenched in our law by Chief
Justice Marshall’s historic decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7
Cranch 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (U.S. 1812).”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239
(1974) (stating that “[t]he concept of the immunity of government officers from
personal liability springs from the same root considerations that generated the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1982).
Thus, these other forms of immunity identified in Brzak are either based on
the Constitution itself, or form the understanding of the Constitution at the time of
ratification. These immunities therefore cannot themselves violate the Constitution
or the fundamental constitutional right to access to the courts.
In contrast, the district court’s application of absolute immunity in favor of
the UN derives merely from the CPIUN. This immunity is not based directly on the
Constitution or hard-wired into our constitutional tradition the way that the
immunities referenced in Brzak are. And therefore, like any statute or treaty, that
immunity must yield to a fundamental constitutional right, like the fundamental
right to access to the courts. As a result, the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to the
UN’s immunity under the CPIUN in this case does not mean that the immunities
identified in Brzak “could not exist.” Brzak, 597 F.3d at 114.
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If the government could articulate a sufficiently important reason for its
assertion of absolute immunity on behalf of the UN—which is has not, and
cannot—this Court could consider that reason at this second step in the access-tothe-courts analysis and determine whether it over-rides the “character and
intensity” of the plaintiffs’ interests and the infringement on the fundamental right
to access the courts. But because the government has not, and cannot, assert a
strong interest against the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to the UN’s immunity
under the CPIUN, the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to access to the courts must
over-ride the district court’s blanket application of absolute immunity for the UN.
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CONCLUSION
The district court in this case “bolt[s] the door to equal justice,” Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956), by granting absolute immunity to the UN. The
court’s grant of absolute immunity means that the plaintiffs in the case have no
way to access the courts, and no other means to protect their interests. The
plaintiffs’ interests in life, family, health, basic subsistence, and others are
significant, while the government has failed to offer any justification for absolute
immunity for the UN as applied in this case. Therefore, on balance, the court’s
grant of absolute immunity to the UN in this case violates the plaintiffs’
fundamental right to access the courts.
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